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Abstract. Science continually contributes new models and rethinks old ones. 
The way inferences are made is constantly being re-evaluated. The practice and 
achievements of science are both shaped by this process, so it is important to 
understand how models and inferences are made. But, despite the relevance of 
models and inference in scientific practice, these concepts still remain contro-
versial in many respects. The attempt to understand the ways models and infer-
ences are made basically opens two roads. The first one is to produce an analy-
sis of the role that models and inferences play in science. The second one is to 
produce an analysis of the way models and inferences are constructed, especial-
ly in the light of what science tells us about our cognitive abilities. The papers 
collected in this volume go both ways. 
Science continually contributes new models and rethinks old ones. The way infer-
ences are made is constantly being re-evaluated. The practice and achievements of 
science are both shaped by this process, so it is important to understand how models 
and inferences are made. 
Despite the relevance of models and inference in scientific practice, these concepts 
are not only multifaceted but also in some sense their definition, role and purpose still 
remain controversial in many respects.  
Let us start with the notion of model. Frigg and Hartmann, for instance, state that: 
 
Models can perform two fundamentally different representational functions. On the one 
hand, a model can be a representation of a selected part of the world (the ‘target sys-
tem’). [...]. On the other hand, a model can represent a theory in the sense that it inter-
prets the laws and axioms of that theory. These two notions are not mutually exclusive 
as scientific models can be representations in both senses at the same time.1 
 
                                                          
1 Frigg and Hartmann 2012, § 1. 
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It seems that the concept of ‘model’ is so wide that it cannot be grasped by means 
of a single, clear definition, and thus its meaning is still controversial. In effect, there 
are several definitions of what models are, which often sharply diverge (see e.g. 
Krause and Bueno 2007, p. 187). For example, Bailer-Jones states that a “model is an 
interpretative description of a phenomenon that facilitates access to that phenome-
non,” and that interpretative descriptions may rely “on idealizations or simplifications 
or on analogies to interpretative descriptions of other phenomena.” Moreover, models 
can “range from being objects, such as a toy airplane, to being theoretical, abstract 
entities, such as the Standard Model of the structure of matter and its fundamental 
particles” (Bailer-Jones 2009, p. 1–2). Along this line, models may be easily con-
ceived as instruments, ‘neither true nor false’: instead, they are useful heuristic devic-
es, which often are effective even when they are ‘false’. 
On the contrary, it has been argued that models cannot be interpreted as useful heu-
ristic devices, because if “theories are vehicles of scientific knowledge, then so too 
must models be” (Suppe 2000, p. S109). The reason for such a claim is that if 
knowledge is intended as being related to the truth, and theories are vehicles of 
knowledge, models of such theories have to be true, nor just metaphor-like or heuris-
tic devices. In fact, in model theory models of a theory make true the axioms of such 
theory. Since those who adopt the semantic view of theories adopt the model theoretic 
concept of ‘model’, they cannot think of models as heuristic devices (Morrison 2009). 
For example, Suppes claims that “the concept of model in the sense of Tarski may be 
used without distortion and as a fundamental concept” in scientific and mathematical 
disciplines, and that “the meaning of the concept of model is the same in mathematics 
and the empirical sciences” (Suppes 1961, p. 165). According to Suppe, “Suppes’ 
claim is that the Tarski concept of a model is a common formal framework for analy-
sis of various uses of models in science and mathematics” (Suppe 2000, p. S111). 
Many authors have criticized this conflation of different senses attached to the term 
‘model’ (Thomson‐Jones 2006). But the problem is that if we decouple the concept of 
model used in model theory from that used for heuristic purposes in scientific prac-
tice, then it is difficult to maintain some of the traditional realist claims about the truth 
of our best scientific theories that many philosophers of science subscribe to. Indeed, 
the best tools to describe the idea that our best theories correctly ‘correspond’ to the 
world have been for a long time Tarski’s theory and the notion of ‘isomorphism’ (da 
Costa and French 2003).  
In effect, the move of denying the identity of the concept of model used in mathe-
matics and that used in scientific practice, by trying to develop a more subject- and 
context-dependent notion of model centered on the notion of ‘representation’ instead 
of that on that of ‘isomorphism’, has faced two main objections. 
First, there is the argument from realist-minded philosophers that such a motive 
implies or at least invites a sort of instrumentalism that is not able to preserve the 
objectivity of science, and thus risks to open the door to skepticism or relativism. 
Second, again coming from some realist philosophers, is that the notion of representa-
tion used by the instrumentalists may be in its turn accounted for in terms of isomor-
phism, and so that the notions of model used in mathematics and in scientific practice 
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are not really distinct and may be in the ultimate analysis reduced to one (French 
2003). 
As concerns the notion of inference, its role, nature and purpose are at stake as 
well, since the orthodox viewpoint put forward by the analytic tradition, modeled on 
mathematical logic, displayed more and more weaknesses, especially in the attempt to 
account for the growth of knowledge (see e.g. Cellucci 2013; Ippoliti 2014). For an 
increasing number of philosophers, this problem requires a completely new approach 
to the concepts of knowledge and inference, both internally and externally. 
More specifically, the standard view of the notion of inference is “formulated by 
Hintikka and Sandu as follows: ‘Inferences can be either deductive, that is, necessari-
ly truth preserving, or ampliative, that is, not necessarily truth preserving’” (Cellucci 
2013, p. 295). Such a distinction is internally inadequate, since it does not produce a 
cogent classification of the various kinds of inference. In particular it does not work 
for abduction. In fact, abduction, as many people understand it, is neither ampliative 
nor truth preserving, and hence it is a counter-example to this standard way of con-
ceiving inferences. If we accept the orthodox distinction between deductive rules 
(truth preserving) and ampliative rules (non-deductive, and hence not truth preserv-
ing), it turns out that abduction “belongs to a different category because, on the one 
hand, like deductive rules, it is non-ampliative, but, on the other hand, unlike them, it 
is not truth preserving” (Ibidem, p. 302). 
On the other side, the standard view is unsatisfactory also externally, that is, with 
respect to the nature, role and purposes of knowledge. For, in the end, it does not 
account for the growth and ampliation of knowledge. Mathematical logic, the model 
of the analytic tradition, is a tool explicitly designed to systematize and justify what is 
already known. It does not aim at producing genuinely new knowledge, since its pur-
pose is to provide a secure foundation for our scientific knowledge, in particular 
mathematics; and the method to do that is the deductive method. 
First, mathematical logic fails as a means of justification, in virtue of a careful 
reading of the limitative results in general, and of the consequences of Gödel’s in-
completeness theorems in particular (see Cellucci 2013). 
Second, the analytic tradition and mathematical logic essentially draw on a re-
striction on the scope of logic, and hence inference, with respect to Plato, Aristotle, 
Descartes and Kant, which turned out to be detrimental to its role in the scientific 
research. 
A promising way out to these difficulties is to approach the notion of inference us-
ing different notions, namely the one of containment instead of truth preservation and 
the one of vindication instead of validation. We will sketch here the former. 
We can produce a more cogent classification of inferential rules in terms of 
ampliative and non-ampliative ones. The former, like induction or analogy, are such 
that their conclusions are not contained in the premises, the information in the conclu-
sion goes beyond the information in the premises. And because of that they can go 
wrong, even if they have heuristic power. The latter, like the deductive rules, are such 
that the conclusion is contained in the premises, that is, the conclusion either is literal-
ly a part of the premises, or entails nothing that is not already entailed by the premis-
es. For instance, in Modus Ponens the conclusion B is literally included in the premis-
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es A, and A → B. Therefore, deductive rules, as non-ampliative rules, have no heuris-
tic power. For a new idea (B in this case) must already be available before the infer-
ence can be constructed. It is not, therefore, an inference to B as new knowledge. It 
goes without saying that it does not mean that they are useless. As a matter of fact, 
since the conclusion of a deductive rule makes explicit all or part of what is contained 
in the premises, it enables us to establishing that its conclusion is plausible, facilitat-
ing the comparison of the premises with experience. 
The bottom line here is that there is no consensus on how models and inferences 
are to be understood. Thus, inquiring into the nature and role of models and infer-
ences is at the top of the philosophical agenda, and tellingly several works have been 
devoted to this issue in recent years (Humphreys and Imbert 2012; Meheus and 
Nickles 2009; Suarez 2009; Morgan and Morrison 1999). 
So the attempt to understand the ways models and inferences are made basically 
opens two roads. The first one is to produce an analysis of the role that models and 
inferences play in science—how sciences use models and inferences to inquire into 
the world. The second one is to produce an analysis of the way models and inferences 
are constructed—how to model the way that scientific knowledge is pursued, espe-
cially in the light of what science tells us about our cognitive abilities. 
This volume goes both ways. In the exploration of the nature and role of models 
and inferences, the contributed papers focus on different aspects of both the way in 
which models and inferences are relevant to science and the way in which science is 
relevant to rethinking what models and inferences are, and how models and inferences 
are made. In fact, the collected papers deal with issues such as: the role of the models 
in scientific practice; how science shapes our conceptions of models; how to model 
the pursuit of scientific knowledge; the relation between our conception of models 
and our conception of science; models and scientific explanation; models in the se-
mantic view of theories; the applicability of mathematical models to the world; the 
relation between models and inferences; models as a means for acquiring new 
knowledge. 
In dealing with those issues, the collected papers clearly underline that in order to 
better understand what models are it is crucial to investigate how our accounts of 
models and inferences are related to the way in which we analyse human knowledge, 
and specifically scientific knowledge. 
Knowledge is indeed a crucial issue when dealing with models and inferences. To 
see this point let us consider some well-known and debated issues in philosophy of 
science. 
The discussion over the nature of abduction, and the related ‘Inference to the Best 
Explanation’, that has taken place in recent years (Magnani 2009; Aliseda 2006; Lip-
ton 2004) can be seen as an example of the relevance of the way in which inferences 
are analysed for the way in which science is characterized, and the reciprocal rele-
vance of the view about science that we adopt for the definition of our ideas with 
regard to the nature of inferences. Whether abduction has to be considered an 
ampliative inference, and whether abductive reasoning has to be considered an ac-
ceptable form of scientific reasoning, are questions deeply related to the dispute over 
scientific realism, i.e., the way in which scientific knowledge has to be understood. 
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Different ways of conceiving the same inference are due to the different conception of 
knowledge that one can deploy. And the concept of knowledge that one can accept is 
at its turn related to the way in which one conceives of the nature and the role of cer-
tain inferences. 
Another example of the connection between the way in which inferences are char-
acterized and the way in which science is analysed is the issue of the ampliativity of 
deduction (Prawitz 2014). To take a stance on that issue clearly makes a great differ-
ence for the way in which one conceives the scientific method. In fact, if deduction 
may give us new knowledge, i.e. something more than what is already contained in 
the premises, then the method of science may be more easily conceived of in axiomat-
ic-deductivist terms. If, on the contrary, deduction is considered not to be ampliative, 
then an axiomatic-deductivist view cannot account for the process of knowledge 
ampliation. And subscribing to a specific view on how the scientific method has to be 
characterized has a great relevance for our considering deduction as ampliative or not, 
and thus has a great relevance on the way in which knowledge is intended (Cellucci 
2013). 
But even science, i.e., our recent scientific acquisitions, is relevant to logic and the 
way in which we conceive of the nature of inferences. For example, naturalism seems 
to be a mainstream tendency in contemporary philosophy, but the impact that a natu-
ralistic stance on logic, inspired by recent work on human cognitive structures and 
evolution, could have on the way in which logic is conceived of is not yet clear 
(Schechter 2013; Dutilh Novaes 2012; Pelletier, Elio and Hanson 2008). 
There is a similar relation between the way in which we conceive of mathematics 
and science. For example, as we have already seen above, despite the wide acceptance 
of the semantic view of theories, which, roughly speaking, says that a theory is the 
class of its models, the difficulties of making such a definition compatible with the 
conception of model usually accepted in model theory have not been overcome (Hal-
vorson 2012). Moreover, models are normally understood by the semanticists as 
mathematical models. Thus, the problem of the relation between a theory and the 
world is connected to the issue of the relation between mathematics and the world. 
This means that the question about the role of models in science is ultimately related 
to the question of the nature of the relation between mathematics and the world, and 
thus to the question about the nature of mathematics (Cellucci 2013).  
This suggests that, as in the case of logic, science not only uses mathematics, but 
even puts pressure on philosophers to rethink what mathematics is, so to make our 
conception of what mathematics is more compatible with what science tells us about 
the way the world is. And doing so, in turn, can even lead us to rethink what science 
is. Thus, not only our models and inferences, but also our way of modelling our mod-
els and inferences are worth being continuously investigated. 
The papers collected in this volume are devoted precisely to the task of  rethinking 
and better understanding what models and inferences are. It will be useful to describe 
their content in some detail. 
Sorin Bangu’s paper, On ‘The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the 
Natural Sciences’, deals with Eugene Wigner’s famous claim that the appropriateness 
of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a miracle 
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(Wigner 1960). Bangu reconstructs Wigner’s argument for the unreasonable effec-
tiveness of mathematics and takes into account six objections to its soundness. After 
having shown that those six objections are weaker than it is usually thought, he raises 
a new objection to Wigner. 
Thomas Nickles, in his Fast and Frugal Heuristics at Research Frontiers, investi-
gates how we should model scientific decision-making at the frontiers of research. 
Nickles explores the applicability of Gigerenzer’s ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics to the 
context of discovery. Such heuristics require only one or a very few steps to a deci-
sion and only a little information. While Gigerenzer’s approach seems promising in 
accounting for the context of discovery, given the limited resources available in fron-
tier contexts, it nevertheless raises challenging questions, since it seems that, accord-
ing to this view of frontier epistemology, we find ourselves in the quite paradoxical 
situation in which the way forward may be to make sparse information even sparser. 
Fabio Sterpetti’s Scientific Realism, the Semantic View and Evolutionary Biology 
deals with the difficulties which arise when we try to apply structural realism and the 
semantic view of theories to some philosophical issues peculiarly related to biology. 
Given the central role that models have in the semantic view, and the relevance that 
mathematics has in the definition of the concept of model, Sterpetti focuses on popu-
lation genetics, which is one of the most mathematized areas in biology, to assess 
French’s proposal (French 2014) of adopting structural realism in dealing with biolo-
gy. 
Emily Grosholz’s Models of the Skies examines the development of models of as-
tronomical systems, beginning with the early 17th century models of the solar system, 
and ending with late 20th century models of galaxies. More precisely, models by Kep-
ler, Newton, Laplace, Clausius, Herschel, Rosse, Hubble, Zwicky, and Rubin are 
taken into account. In each case she emphasizes the distinction and the interaction 
between the aims of reference and analysis, and the ways in which disparate modes of 
representation combine to enlarge scientific knowledge. 
Carlo Cellucci, in his Models of Science and Models in Science, deals with the is-
sue of how it is possible to model science. Indeed, with regard to science, one may 
speak of models in two different senses, i.e. ‘models of science’ and ‘models in sci-
ence’. A model of science is a representation of how scientists build their theories, a 
model in science is a representation of empirical objects, phenomena, or processes. 
Cellucci considers five models of science: the analytic-synthetic model, the deductive 
model, the abstract deductive model, the semantic model, and the analytic model. 
After presenting them, he assesses to what extent each of them is capable of account-
ing for models in science. 
Raffaella Campaner’s Mechanistic Models and Modeling Disorders deals with the 
debate on how disorders should be modeled, and focuses on some issues arising from 
modeling neuropsychiatric disorders. More precisely, she discusses some models of 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The main aspects of such models are 
analyzed in the light of the philosophical debate about mechanistic models. The paper 
highlights how the neo-mechanist accounts of models can only partly capture the 
many aspects entering the dynamics of modeling disorders in an actual medical sce-
nario. 
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Sergio Caprara’s and Angelo Vulpiani’s paper, About the Ontic/Epistemic Charac-
ter of Chaos and the Content of Stochastic Models in Physics, deals with the issue of 
clarifying the distinction between determinism and predictability. In order to show 
that the two concepts are completely unrelated, Caprara and Vulpiani analyse the 
Lyapunov exponents and the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy and show how deterministic 
chaos, although it possesses an epistemic character, is not subjective at all. They also 
show how this is useful to shed light on the role of stochastic models in the descrip-
tion of the physical world. 
Emiliano Ippoliti’s paper, Ways of Advancing Knowledge. A Lesson from Knot 
Theory and Topology, investigates the ways of advancing knowledge focusing on the 
construction of several approaches put forward to solve problems in topology and 
knot theory. More precisely, Ippoliti considers two problems: the classification of 
knots and the classification of 3-manifolds. Examining the attempts made to solve 
those problems, Ippoliti is able to specify some key features of the ampliation of 
knowledge, such as the role of representation, theorem-proving and analogy, and to 
derive some considerations on the very nature of mathematical objects. 
Juha Saatsi’s paper, Models, Idealisations, and Realism, deals with the difficulties 
that, for the scientific realist, derive from the role that idealizations and abstractions 
play in models. Indeed, realists maintain that predictively successful models tell us 
the truth about the unobservable world. But how should the realist construe the way in 
which models latch onto unobservable reality? This is a problem, since models essen-
tially incorporate various kinds of idealisations and approximations that cannot be 
interpreted realistically and that are indispensable to both their predictive and their 
explanatory use. Saatsi tries to face such a challenge by arguing that it is the modal 
character of idealisations that accounts for their utility from a realist perspective. 
In Modelling Non-Empirical Confirmation Richard Dawid argues that non-
empirical theory confirmation plays an important role in the scientific process and 
that it should be considered an extension of empirical confirmation. Since confirma-
tion is mostly understood in Bayesian terms, Dawid proposes a formalization of non-
empirical confirmation within a Bayesian framework that demonstrates that non-
empirical confirmation does have the same structural characteristics of empirical the-
ory confirmation. The No Alternative Argument (Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger 
2015) is then illustrated and debated. 
Reuben Hersh’s paper deals with the issue of modeling mathematics. Indeed, phi-
losophy of mathematics deals with models of mathematics, which is in large part 
already a model, because much of mathematics is a model of physical action. Arith-
metic, for instance, models the human action of counting. Hersh’s suggestion is that 
in order to facilitate the creation of a unified field of inquiry on mathematics, philoso-
phers should start thinking of their work as model-building instead of arguing for their 
chosen position against opposing positions.  
Lorenzo Magnani’s paper, Scientific Models Are Distributed and Never Abstract: 
A Naturalistic Perspective, analyses several definitions of models: from the classical 
ones, which see models as abstract entities and idealizations, to the more recent, 
which see models as fictions, surrogates, credible worlds, missing systems, make-
believe, parables, epistemic actions. Magnani reveals some of their epistemological 
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inadequacies, sometimes by appealing to recent results in cognitive science. Magnani 
specifically addresses epistemological  relying on recent results on the role of distrib-
uted and abductive cognition. 
Kahindo Kamau’s and Emily Grosholz’s paper The Use of Models in Petroleum 
and Natural Gas Engineering inquires how adequate are some of the fundamental 
models in the science of petroleum and natural gas engineering. The authors try to 
unveil what assumptions were made as the models were created. They claim that a 
good account of the adequacy of models must be strongly pragmatist, for the ques-
tions related to their adequacy cannot be answered properly without paying attention 
to human purposes. They also claim that many of the distortions and over-
simplifications in these models are in fact intentional and useful, when we examine 
the models in the light of their pragmatic aims. 
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